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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Record No. 2345 
W. R. MUMPOWER 
vs. 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF BRISTOL 
and CITY OF BRISTOL 
PETIT.ION 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia: 
Your petitioner, W. R. Mumpower, respectfully states that 
he is aggrieved by a final decree of the Corporation Court for 
the City of Bristol, Virginia, entered in the above styled cause 
on the 19th day of July, 1940. 
A transcript of the record of said chancery cause accom-
panies this petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This cause was submitted on complainant's bill, defend-
ants' demurrers thereto and complainant's joinder therein. 
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Complainant, in his bill, alleges that he is a citize.n resi-
dent, taxyayer, and property owner of and in the City of 
2 * *Bristol, Virginia, and attacks as illegal and unconstitut-
ional the creation, organization and function of the Hous-
ing Authority of the City of Bristol, hereinafter referred to as the 
Authority. The bill challenges the right of said Authority to 
issue bonds, the right of the City Council, by its resolution or 
ordinance, to authorize the Mayor to appoint members of the 
Authority, the action of the Mayor in making such appoint-
ments, the organization of the Authority, the authority to en-
ter into and the validity of the cooperation agreement between 
the Authority and the City, the legality and validity of the two 
contracts between the Bristol Authority and the United States 
Housing Authority and the legality and ·validity of the con-
tract between the Bristol Authority and V. L. Nicholson Com-
pany. Copies of all the contracts, except the last, are exhibited 
with the Bill, which prays for a declaratory judgment as to the 
validity of the entire "Housing Authorities Law" (Chapter 
310, Acts of Assembly 1938, Code Supp. Sec. 3145 ( 1)-
( 24) Incl.), which will be hereinafter referred to as the "Act". 
The bill further prays that all functions and actions of the said 
Housing Authority of the City of Bristol be enjoined. 
The grounds of complainant's attack are briefly as fol-
lows: 
I. The General Assembly is without power to create such 
Authority. 
3 * * 2. Tre property of such Authority is not exempt from 
taxation under Virginia Constitution, Sec. 183. 
3. The purpose of the Authority is not a public purpose, 
and the taking of property by it is for a private use. 
4. The bonds of the Authority are bonds of the City of 
Bristol and are issued in violation of the Constitution of Vir-
ginia, Sec. 127. 
5. The contract of the City with the Authority is illegal 
in that it undertakes to bind future members of the City Council 
in the exercise of their legislative functions contrary to Virginia 
Constitution, Sec. 185. 
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The defendants filed separate demurrers to the bill upon 
the ground that the "Act" is constitutional, and that the acts 
and contracts complained of are pursuant thereto and in com-
pliance therewith. 
The court held that a portion of paragraph 1 1 of the co-
operation agreement between the City of Bristol and Bristol 
Housing Authority, providing that the City "will vacate and 
close any streets, roads, roadways, alleys, sidewalks and other 
places ( which the Authority finds are reasonably necessary in 
the development of the project) located in the areas of such 
project and adjacent thereto, and a portion of paragraph 1 2 of 
the same agreement, binding the City to accept such land as the 
Authority determines to be reasonably necessary for such 
4 * streets, and alleys, to be void and * illegal as an illegal dele-
gation of legislative discretion by the City Council. 
In all other respects the demurrers were sustained, the in-
junction denied and the bill dismissed. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The Court erred in sustaining defendants' demurrer to com-
plainant's bill and in denying the injunction sought by complain-
ant and dismissing complainant's bill. 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
The fundamental issue involved is whether slum clearance 
and low cost housing for public use are purposes within the po-
lice power of the legislation. The Act states a two-fold pur-
pose: ( 1) Slum eradication, ( 2) Low cost housing for low in-
come families. In determining this issue of public use both of 
these purposes must be examined and a further question arises, 
whether if ( 1) is a public use and ( 2) if not, does low cost hous-
ing become a legitimate public enterprise merely because of its 
juxtaposition to slum clearance. 
Counsel for petitioner will discuss and endeavor to main-
tain the following propositions in the order stated: 
( 1) Slum clearance as provided by the Act and undertak-
en by the local Authority is not a public use. 
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5 * * (2) The creation of low cost housing is not a public 
purpose. 
(3) If slum clearance and low cost housing are public 
purposes, these purposes are destroyed by the sections of the Act 
which allow mortgage, sale and lease of the property. 
(4) The Legislature is without power to create this po-
litical sub-division. 
( 5) Property owned by the local Housing Authority is 
not tax exempt. 
( 6) The cooperation agreement between the City and the 
Authority is ultra vires and in violation of Sec. 185 of the Con-
stitution of Virginia. 
( 7) The proposed issue of bonds by the Housing Au-
thority of the City of Bristol is in violation of Sec. 12 7 of the 
Constitution of Virginia. 
ARGUMENT 
(1) SLUM CLEARANCE AS PROVIDED BY THE 
ACT AND UNDERTAKEN BY THE LOCAL AUTHOR-
ITY IS NOT A PUBLIC USE. 
At the outset it is to be borne in mind that the mere decla-
ration of a public purpose by the legislature and by the City 
Council of Bristol does not ipso facto establish a public use. It is 
the function of the judiciary to determine this question in each 
specific instance. 
6* State Highway Commissioner v. Kreger, 128 Va. 203, 221. 
I 05 s. E. 2 I 7 
It must be admitted that slum clearance in the abstract is 
a public purpose, but in the case at bar, the defendant Authority 
has already proceeded with its plari and we are able to look at 
the project itself. It wm be readily seen that the slum has not 
been eradicated. It has merely been removed to another section 
of the city. The published estimate rental rates of the new hous-
es in the process of erection are clearly beyond the means of 
the class of people who have been ejected from the district 
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affected. All slum districts have not been eliminated with the 
result that there is an overcrowding and even worse source of 
filth and disease than heretofore existed. The rental rate on the 
dwellings erected has a two-fold result: the previous slum dwel-
lers are unable to afford the cost; the dwellings will be attractive 
to families with incomes from$ I ,000.00 to $2,000.00 and there 
will be a loss of tenants from dwellings which are in no sense 
slums-in other words, a definite competition with private cap-
ital and enterprise. 
However, since it is the Act· itself which is being attacked, 
let us view the Act with the view of determining what can be 
done by the authority under its terms. The Federal statute pro-
vides, in substance, that no capital grant or annual contri-
7* bution shall be made to any local authority *unless the lat-
ter agrees to eliminate unsanitary dwelling units to the 
number of those constructed under a project, subject to a quite 
elastic provision, however, that gives the United States Housing 
Authority discretion to grant relief therefrom. 
In compliance with such requirement of the Federal statute, 
the Housing Authority of the City of Bristol entered into a con-
tract with the City of Bristol, whereby not the Housing Author-
ity but the City itself agrees to eliminate the unsafe or unsani-
tary dwelling units within the territorial limits of the city (Co-
operation Agreement, paragraph 2) in any one of three ways, 
to-wit: (a) by demolishing dwelling units which are on land 
acquired by the City by purchase or otherwise, including de-
molition of such dwelling units on land purchased for any pub-
lic uses; or (b) by causing compulsory demolition, effective 
closing. repair or improvement of such unsafe, unsanitary dwel-
ling units; or (c) by inducing private owners voluntarily to 
eliminate such dwelling units. 
The effect of the contractural provision is almost complete-
ly emasculated by a further provision in the contract (Coopera-
tion Agreement, paragraph 5) which defines unsafe condition 
as one where by reason of dilapidation, faulty arrangement or 
design, or lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, 
8* a dwelling is detrimental to safety, health *or morals. 
Compliance with this requirement for the elimination of 
unsanitary dwelling units could therefore be secured by the mere 
act of the City of Bristol in persuading John Doe, as a property 
owner, to provide a little more ventilation in his home or change 
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his sanitation facilities, all upon the theory that the existing con-
dition might be detrimental to health. Wide latitude is provided 
for the flimsiest determination of the existence of such unsafe ac-
comodations as disclosed by Sec. 3 r 54 (4) of the Code by its 
reference to the degree of overcrowding, the percentage of land 
coverage, the light, air, space and access available to the inhabit-
ants of such dwelling accomodations, the size and arrangement 
of the rooms, the sanitary facilities, and the extent to which con-
ditions exist in such buildings which endanger life or property 
by fire or other causes. If a city building inspector should dis-
cover a defect in John Doe's electrical wiring that might cause 
a short c:rcuit, his persuasion of Mr. Doe to correct it would 
constitute the elimination of an insanitary dwelling accommo-
dation. 
Not only can such hypocritical performance of the slum-
clearance obligation of the contract be delayed to a time one year 
after the completion of each project (Cooperation Agreement, 
paragraph No. 9) but even default in the performance of 
9* *the contract by the City of Bristol would sustain no judg-
ment for money damages and the city, with absolute im-
punity, could utterly disregard the promise. 
( 2) THE CREATION OF LOW COST HOUSING IS 
NOT A PUBL(C PURPOSE. 
The dwelling accommodations authorized can hardly be 
truthfully described as "low cost" because the Federal Act, 
42 U.S. C. A., Sec. 1410, indicated an authorization at the rate 
of$ r ,000.00 per room. This cost is for the structure alone and 
d:sregards the expenditure necessary for land. If lack of space 
be one defect of the sl urns Code Sec. 3 145 ( 3) (j) and a four 
room unit be regarded as a minimum for a slum family with less 
than three minors, then it can hardly be said that the proje:t 
even necessarily under the law will result in a low cost per fam-
ily unit. The present estimate is beyond the means of the slum 
dweller and if the experience be used as a guide, actual costs are 
Ekely to exceed the est:mates. Indeed, were it not that both 
principal and interest are planned to be absorbed by the United 
States and its body of taxpayers, the housing accommodations 
could hardly be rentable at a particular low figure, even with 
freedom from property taxation. 
It is submitted that government interference or operation 
could be extended to almost every conceivable private 
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Io* *enterprise if the only necessary reason for so doing were 
that desired result, public health, could be more cheaply 
obtained for low income classes by use of government funds and 
tax exemption-the dairy business, the meat packing business, 
the· coal business, the lumber business, the clothing business, un-
til we should have a completely socialized or commonized state. 
The erection of "low cost" or any cost dwellings does not 
tend to be monopolisitc, as in the cases of electric power or water 
supply, nor is wide spread cooperation necessary as in the case of 
postal service, nor is there involved the permanent use of public 
~treets and highways or resources publicly owned. It is submitted 
that there is no precedent in this country for extending govern-
ment competition with private enterprise to such an extent. 
Attention is directed to the language of the Mass. Court in 
Opinion of Justices, 2 11 Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611: 
"Experiments in other lands, where the people have estab-
lished either no bounds or fragile ones to the absolutism of gov-
ernmental powers by a written Constitution affords no guide 
in the determination of what our Constitution permits." 
Slum clearance may be, and if properly carried out, un-
doubtedly is, a public purpose, but low cost housing is 
I 1 * not. * It by no means follows that "low cost housing" is 
a necessary corollary to slum clearance. We believe it has 
been demonstrated that slum clearance as provided by the Hous-
ing Authority Law and as practiced by the defendant Housing 
Authority has no necessary connection with "low cost housing" 
as provided and practiced. Indeed it clearly appears that the class 
of people ejected from the slum areas in the project are not the 
class which will benefit from the "low cost housing." How-
ever, since the Housing Authorities Law contemplates each pur-
pose as necessary to the success of the other, it necessarily follows 
that the Statute, Code Section 3145, being void in part is void 
in toto. 
Robertson v. Preston, 97 Va. 300, 33 S. E. 618 
Campbell v. Bryant, 104 Va. 509, 52 S. E. 638 
(3) IF SLUM CLEARANCE AND LOW COST 
HOUSING ARE PUBLIC PURPOSES. THESE PURPOSES 
ARE DESTROYED BY THE SECTIONS OF THE ACT 
WHICH ALLOW MORTGAGE, SALE AND LEASE OF 
THE PROPERTY. 
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The act is designed to operate in conjunction with the 
Federal statute ( even the term "housing project" is defined to 
mean a work to be financed in whole or in part by the Federal 
government) and it contemplates the loss of title of the 
1 2 * property held by the Authority and the suN."ender * and 
abolition of the function operating it, in the event of de-
fault in the payment of the bonds sold to the Federal agency or 
the Io per cent sold to private individuals. We call the Court's 
attention to the following provisions of the Act, Code Sec. 3 I 45 
(8) (d) The Authority may sell, lease or mortgage the prop-
erty. 
Code Sec. 3 1 45 ( 1 o) . by the second paragraph thereof 
there may be vested in the obligee of the bonds, including a pri-
vate holder (Code Sec. 3 145 ( 3) (m) ) : the right to take pos-
session of the project or acquire title thereto through foreclosure 
proceedings, free from the restrictions mentioned in Code Secs. 
3 145 ( 9) (Io). relating to the rents to be charged and the quali-
fications of the tenants to be allowed to occupy the dwelling ac-
commodations, which provisions are the ones that are alleged to 
give the project its character of a public purpose. 
Code Sec. 3 145 ( 16), by sub-section (a) the revenues of 
the project may be pledged, and by sub-section (b) the authority 
may mortgage its real property, and by sub-section ( c) the au-
thority may vest in a trustee the right to take possession, and use, 
operate and manage the project. 
Code Sec. 3145 ( 18). by sub-section (a) the authority 
may cause possession to be surrendered to the "obligee" mention-
ed in Sec. 3145 (3) (m). 
13 * * In view of several repetitions of the provisions relating 
to mortgaging, foreclosing and pledging, the deliberate de-
sign is quite apparent to give to the federal agency a stranglehold 
over the operation of the local project, even to the point of sur-
render of the "state" function, to the federal government or to a 
banking trustee. After such surrender, what then would be the 
nature of the function? Would the federal government then be-
come an agency of the state, free from the slightest vestige of 
control by any state official? Suppose. for instance, that under 
the terms of the deed of trust the trustee, a bank, takes possession 
of the project on default. and proceeds to rent for the benefit of 
the bond holders including the holders of the privately sold 1 o 
per cent, entirely free from the limitations as to the amount of 
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rents to be charged and from the restrictions as to the persons 
who may qualify as tenants in the dwellings, which limitations 
are specifically abolished in the last paragraph of Code Sec. 3 145 
( 1 o). Entirely vanished are the public purposes and the per-
formance of any public function and gone, too, must certainly 
be any exemption from taxation. 
Whatever might seem to be the relative weights of the 
proprietary function theory and the governmental property-
trust theory when it comes to a mortgage, sale or lease of 
14 * *municipally owned public utilities, it would seem to be 
a radical departure from accepted principles to authorize 
permanent loss· of control of property held for non-proprietary 
or strictly "governmental" purposes. If the housing project be 
considered of a proprietary nature, the aspect of state function is 
destroyed, and if considered not proprietary, but a state function, 
then the statute authorizing loss of control of the state functional 
instrumentality is in derogation of state sovereignty. 
We call the Court's attention to the doubt on this point ex-
pressed by the learned lower court in his opinion (Pr. 42, 43) 
It thus follows that the above quoted provisions of the 
Act either destroy the act itself. or at least should be held to be 
void. 
4. THE LEGISLATURE IS WITHOUT POWER TO 
CREATE THIS POLITICAL SUB-DIVISION. 
Section 63 of the Constitution of Virginia provides, "The 
authority of the general assembly shall extend to all subjects of 
legislation not herein forbidden or restricted.'' 
The creation of political sub-divisions is not specifically or 
expressly forbidden. 
The creation of drainage districts under Code Section I 73 7 
has been upheld by the courts of this state as a valid 
15 * exercise of the police power. 
Strawberry Hill Land Corp. v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71 97 
S. E. 362. 
And the creation of sanitary districts under Code Sec. 1560 
does not appear to have been challenged. 
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However, if the public purpose of the Housing Authorities 
Law fails because of the inclusion of the house erection element 
then the case at bar is clearly distinguishable. 
The power of the legislature would seem to be lacking for 
another reason. Section 63 (7) expressly forbids the legis-
lature to exempt property from taxation, and Sec. 183 (a) of 
the constitution expressly exempts political sub-division from 
taxation. The legislature cannot do indirectly by creating a 
political sub-division what it can not do directly, namely, ex-
empt property from taxation. Since the property can not thus 
be exempt from taxation, and since this is a vital part of the 
legislation and of the cooperation agreement, the whole act thus 
becomes invalid. 
5. PROPERTY OWNED BY DEFESDANT HOUS-
ING AUTHORITY IS NOT TAX EXEMPT. 
Since the statute which purports to create defendant Hous-
ing Authority as a political sub-division is invalid, the property 
of the defendant is, therefore, not exempt by law. It also 
16* follows that the city's agreement not to tax the * property 
(Cooperation Agreement, Sec 10) is ultra vires and in-
valid under Sec. 1 83 of the Constitution. 
City of Bristol v. Dominion National Bank, I 5 3 Va. 71, 
149 S. E. 632. 
6. THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE CITY AND THE AUTHORITY IS ULTRA VIRES 
AND IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 185 OF THE CON-
STITUTION. 
Complainant calls Court's attention to Sec. 1 o, 11 and 12 
of the Cooperation Agreement. The pertinency of these para-
graphs is apparent when read in conjunction with the require-
ments of the United States Housing Act as a condition for the 
grant of Federal funds by use of loans and contributions. 
In paragraph IO the City agrees to furnish to the Author-
ity and its tenants services and facilities within the area of the 
project without charge, of the same character as those furnished 
without charge to the other inhabitants of the county including 
police and health protection and services and street maintenance 
and specifically the city agrees to maintain in good repair the 
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public streets within, adjacent or leading to the boundaries of the 
project. Without charge various services are furnished by the 
city at the present time to its inhabitants, such as fire protection, 
police protection, etc. The use of city funds for that purpose is 
justified. However, our objection is that the city is attempting 
as a contractural matter, to barter away, surrender and 
17* abdicate, the powers granted to it by law and to guarantee 
what will be the decision of future City Councils in the 
matter of whether benefit districts should be established in the 
vicinity of the area of the project or should include the area of 
the project within such district, or whether the services shall be 
free. 
In paragraph 1 1 of the contract the city agrees to zone the 
area of the project, to an appropriate residential classification. 
No future city council could be mandamused to exercise the legis-
lative power to so zone, and whether such zoning or any zoning 
should be made lies entirely in their discretion. This contract 
purports to bind future Boards affirmatively to adopt such resi-
dential zoning plan. 
Paragraph 1 2 of the agreement binds the Authority to dedi-
cate and the city to accept any land that the Authority deter-
mines to use for streets and alleys within the project. If the 
Authority does decide to use land within the project for streets, 
the matter of the acceptance thereof by the city is one of legis-
lative discretion as to which no present council can bind any 
future council. 
The lower court has held paragraphs 1 I and 1 2 void as 
illegal delegations of legislative discretion, and it is submitted 
that paragraph 1 o is void for the same reason. 
Under Sec. 1 3 the city is incurring a financial obligation, 
the exact amount of which is unknown. However, the amount 
is certainly substantial. It is, therefore, in violation of 
I 8 * * Sec. 185 of the Constitution. 
7. THE PROPOSED ISSUE OF BONDS BY THE 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF BRISTOL IS 
IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 127 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF VIRGINIA. 
A. The defendant Housing Authority is an agency of the 
City of Bristol. 
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It has been previously shown that the designation of the 
defendant authority as a political sub-division is invalid. 
As a matter of general knowledge, cities and counties in the 
Commonwealth are separate and distinct political sub-divisions 
with abutting boundaries and have jurisdiction limited to their 
immediate defined and separate territories . 
. . . . A city "shall be construed to mean an incorpo-
rated community, having within defined boundaries a pop-
ulation of five thousand or more, or any incorporated com-
munity containing less than five thousand inhabitants 
which had a city charter at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution; and the word 'town' shall be construed to 
mean an incorporated community not having a city charter 
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, containing 
within defined boundaries a population of less than five 
thousand .... " (Michie's Va. Code of 1936, Title 2, 
Sec. 6, Clause 16). See also, Constitution Art. VIII, Sec. 
II6. 
The extent to which a county government is contiguous 
to and borders a city government is inferentially defined in the 
statutory provision relating to the "Powers of Boards of Con-
ties Adjoining Certain Cities:'' 
"The boards of supervisors of counties adjoining and 
abutting any city, within or without this State, having a 
population of one hundred and twenty-five thousand or 
1 9 * more, as shown by United * States census, and the boards 
of supervisors of counties adjoining any county whi::h ad-
joins and abuts any such city and has a density of popu-
lation of five hundred or more to the square mile, are here-
by vested with the same powers and authority as are now 
vested or which may hereafter be vested in the councils of 
cities and· towns by virtue of the constitution of the state 
of Virginia, or the acts of the general assembly passed or 
which may hereafter be passed, in pursuance thereof; ... " 
Code, Sec. 2 7 4 3 B, as amended by Chap. 5 5, Acts of 
1938). 
Since the Code of the Commonwealth and the Constitution 
provide for only enumerated political sub-divisions - cities, 
town, counties-the Housing Authority of the City of Bristol 
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with an area of operation coincident with the boundaries of the 
City of Bristol (Housing Authorities Law, Chap. 125B, Sec. 
3145 (3) (f) Va. Code of 1936, 1938 Supp.) must be deemed 
to be an agency of the City, comparable to the City's police, fire, 
a.nd health departments or other municipal boards, or commis-
s10ns. 
Organization and Government of Cities and Towns (Con-
stitution, Secs. 1 16- 1 28; Code of I 93 6, Title 26, Cities 
and Towns). 
Organization and Government of Counties, (Constitution, 
Sec. I Io- 115a; Code Chap. r 09C). 
The Housing Authorities Law, itself, when certain random 
items are considered, in the aggregate, proves conclusively that a 
Housing Authority is an agency of a city government. 
Thus, the housing act, (Chap. I 25B, Sec. 3 145 (4) , 
20* Code of 1936, 1938Supp.) setsforththatahousingau-
thority is created in each city or county, that the said au-
thority is " to be known as the 'housing authority' of the city or 
county," and that "such authority shall not transact any business 
or exercise its powers .... until or unless the governing body of 
the city .... by proper resolution shall declare at any time here-
after that there is need for a housing authority to function in 
such city . . . . . " 
Therefore, as an arm of the City, bonds issued by the Hous-
ing Authority are subject to the constitutional (Art. VIII, Secs. 
r 23, 127) and statutory provisions (Code of I 936, Chap, I 22, 
Secs. 3079-309 rn) relating to the purposes and procedures for 
which municipal bonds may be issued, and the limitations on 
the power of a city or town to incur indebtedness. 
Likewise, provisions in the Housing Authorities Law (Secs. 
3 145 ( 14) -3 I 45 ( I 6) with respect to the issuance of bonds by 
a Housing Authority are subject to the above constitutional re-
strictions, and must be strictly construed. 
A municipality cannot be vested by statute with powers the 
legislature does not possess. 
M cClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp., et al, 152 Va. 1, 145 
s. E. 425, 43 I. 
Any fair reasonable doubt concerning existence of power 
of a municipality is resolved against its existence. 
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21 * Bd. of Supervisors or Henrico County v. Richmond, I 62 
Va. 14, 173 S. E. 356 
B. The Violation of the Constitution. 
( 1) Article VIII, Sec. 127 of the Constitution of Vir-
ginia of 1902, as amended, reads as follows: 
"No city or town shall issue any bonds or other in-
terest-bearing obligations for any purpose, or in any man-
ner, to an amount which, including existing indebtedness, 
shall, at any time, exceed eighteen percentum of the as-
sessed valuation of the real estate in the city or town sub-
ject to taxation, as shown by the last preceding assessment 
for taxes; provided, however, that nothing above contain-
ed in this section shall apply to those cities and towns whose 
charters existing at the adoption of this Constitution auth-
orize a larger percentage of indebtedness than is authorized 
by this section; and provided further, that in determining 
the limitation of the power of a city or town to incur in-
debtedness there shall not be included the following classes 
of indebtedness. 
"(a) Certificates of indebtedness, revenue bonds or 
other obligations issued in anticipation of the collection of 
the revenue of such city or town for the then current year; 
provided that such certificates, bonds or other obligations 
mature within one year from the date of their issue, and be 
not past due, and do not exceed the revenue for such year; 
"(b) Bonds authorized by an ordinance enacted in 
accordance with section One Hundred and Twenty-three, 
and approved by the affirmative vote of the majority of 
the qualified voters of the city or town voting upon the 
question of their issuance, at the general election next suc-
ceeding the enactment of the ordinance or as a special elect-
ion held for that purpose for a supply of water or other 
specific undertaking from which the city or town may de-
rive a revenue; but from and after a period to be determin-
ed by the council. not exceeding five years from the date of 
such election, whenever and for so long as such untlertaking 
22* fails to produce *sufficient revenue to pay for cost of op-
eration and administration (including interest on bonds is-
sued therefor), and the cost of insurance against loss by in-
jury to persons or property, and an annual amount to be, 
covered into a sinking fund sufficient to pay, at or before 
maturity, all bonds issued on account of said undertaking, 
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all such bonds outstanding shall be included in determining 
the limitation of the power to incur indebtedness, unless the 
principal and interest thereof be made payable exclusively 
from the receipts of the undertaking." 
To the ~ame effect, see "Bond Issues by Cities and Towns," 
MichiesCodeof 1936, Chap. 122, Secs. 3079, (amended, 1938, 
Acts, p. 3 3, 3080) 
(2) This section must be read in the light of the relevant 
sections of the Code, as cited above. It is elementary that all re-
lated provisions of the Constitution and pertinent statutes must 
be considered and read together in construing a constitutional 
provision. 
Board of Supervisors of King and Queen County, v. Cox, 
et al, 156 S. E. 755, 761, 155 Va. 687 
Likewise, Sec. 43 (E) of the Charter of the City of Bristol, 
contains the same 18 per cent restriction as contained in the Con-
stitution. It is not necessary to go into the figures showing the 
effect of the issuance of these bonds on the present bonded in-
debtedness of the total property in Bristol. The allegation con-
tained in the bill is taken as true for the purpose of this de-
demurrer. 
In any event, the limitations of this section apply to the 
charters of all cities and towns which do not in terms 
23 * *authorize a percentage of indebtedness larger than I 8 
percent of the assessed valuation of taxable real estate in 
such city and town. 
Robertson v. City of Staunton, 104 Va. 73, 7 4, 5 I S. E. 
178, 179. 
( 3) Moreover, the constitutional limitation of the in-
debtedness of a city does not pertain to: 
(a) Tax anticipation warrants or bonds maturing in a 
period not exceeding one year. 
(b) Revenue bonds authorized by an ordinance validly 
passed by the City Council (in accordance with Art. VIII, Sec. 
r 23 of the Constitution) and approved by a majority of the 
· qualified voters of the city. However, such bonds are subject 
to inclusion within the limitation on the city's power to incur 
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indebtedness if the anticipated revenue, within a period speci-
fied by the City Council ( not exceeding 5 years from election 
date) is insufficient to cover expenses of the operation and ad-
ministration of the undertaking, and the interest and principal 
on the bonds. 
· 'In other words, in determining the limitation of the 
power of a city to incur indebtedness there shall not be 
considered the indebtedness mentioned in sub-section (a) 
and sub-section (b) of Sec. 127." 
McDaniel v. City of Clifton Forge, 13 7 Va. 650, 120 S. 
E. 143, 144· 
It must be noted, parenthetically, that Section 1 23 of the 
constitution, providing the method of passing an ordi-
24 * nance authorizing the borrowing of money by the munici-
pality is self-executing. 
Ennis v. Town of Herndon, 168 Va. 539, 191 S. E. 685, 
690. 
(4) Clearly, the proposed issuance of the bonds of the 
Housing Authority of the City of Bristol falls within the con-
stitutional limitation embraced in Sec. 127 (b). Therefore, as 
revenue bonds are payable entirely from the revenue of the un-
dertaking, "an affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified 
voters of the city voting upon the question at an election duly 
called for the purpose" is essential. 
CONCLUSION 
We wish to emphasize to the Court that the real evil at-
tacked by the bill and which we have attempted to show in this 
brief is that the low cost new housing construction program, 
which is really the heart of the Housing Authority Law, is a 
socialistically unconstitutional field of public endeavor and that 
under the rule that those things cannot be done indirectly which 
cannot be done directly, the attempted legitimatization of this 
new housing construction program by the inclusion of a slum 
clearance purpose should fail. 
Counsel for petitioner adopt this petition as their brief. 
25 * *Copy of this petition was delivered to Donald T. Stant, 
Esquire, counsel for Housing Authority for City of Bristol 
Mumpower vs. Housing Authority of Bristol I 7 
and to Floyd H. Roberts, Esquire, counsel for the City of Bris-
tol, on the 21st day of Augustt 1940. 
JONES and WOODWARD, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
I, \Vm. H. Woodward, Attorney, practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opin-
ion the final decree complained of in the foregoing petition for 
appeal should be reviewed. 
Wm. H. WOODWARD. 
Received August 21st 1940. 
P. W. C. 
Appeal allowed. Bond $300.00. 
PRESTON W. CAMPBELL. 
Received August 23, 1940. 
M.B.W. 
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RECORD 
In the Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, Virginia. 
W. R. Mumpower 
vs. 
Housing Authority of the City of Bristol and City of Bristol. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, on May I 3, 1940 
W.R. Mumpower filed his original bill against the above named 
defendants therein, which bill, the exhibits thereto, the separate 
demurrers of defendants, and all other material proceedings had 
in said cause, are in the following words and figures: 
ORIGINA LBILL Filed May 13, 1940 
To the Honorable J. L. Cantwell, Jr., Judge: 
Complainant above named respectfully represents: 
1. That he is a citizen r£sident, property owner and tax-
payer of the City of Bristol, Virginia, and among other real es-
tate owned by him is that capable of being developed, improv-
ed and rented; that as such taxpayer and property owner his 
interests are both generally affected by the facts hereinafter set 
forth, as are all other taxpayers and property owners similarly 
situated. 
2. That the defendant Housing Authority purports to 
be a political sub-division of the State of Virginia, created by 
Chapter 3 1 o of its General Assembly, approved March 28, 
1938, (Code Supp. 1938, section 3145), pursuant to which the 
Council of defendant City by ordinance or resolution adopted 
and approved by its Mayor on September 6, I 938, declared of 
its own motion that there was need of such an Authority, in the 
language following: 
page 3 ] "RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Bristol, 
Virginia, under the provisions of Chapter 3 1 o of the 
Acts of Assembly of Virginia of I 93 8, that there is in said City 
of Bristol need for a housing authority, and in connection there-
with does hereby find and declare, of its own motion, that in-
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sanitary and unsafe inhabited dwelling accommodations exist 
in the City of Bristol, and that there is a shortage of safe and 
sanitary dwelling accommodations in the City available to per-
sons of low income at rentals which they can afford. 
"RESOLVED FURTHER that a copy of this resolution 
be transmitted by the Clerk to the Mayor, in accordance with 
said Aact.'' 
Pursuant to said act and ordinance, the Mayor of defend-
ant City appointed five commissioners of said Authority, desig-
nated its first chairman and filed a certificate thereof with the 
Clerk as required by said act; that said appointees thereafter took 
and subscribed the required oath. and on the 22nd day of Sep-
tember, 1938, held their organization meeting and elected a 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman and employed a Secretary, who 
is known under the Act as an Executive Director, and has since 
acted as such. The term of office of one Commissioner (who 
has been appointed as the first Chairman) having expired, the 
Mayor re-appointed him, and upon his later resignation ap-
pointed his ·successor, and thereupon another Chairman was du-
ly selected by the Commissioners then in office and as thus con-
stituted the defendant Authority has since continued to act and 
is now acting. 
3. That the defendant City is a municipal Corporation 
organized, created and existing under the general laws of the 
State of Virginia, with the power to sue and be sued, contract 
and be contracted with. and with all ·powers, privileges and du-
ties incident to and necessary to the orderly functioning of such 
corporation. 
page 4 ] 4. That the authority, if any, for the action of the 
Mayor in the appointment of the defendant members 
to said Authority; the authority, if any, for the action of the 
City Council in passing the aforementioned resolution; the au-
thority, if any. for the acts of the defendant Authority, hereto-
fore and hereinafter set forth, is derived from, and by virtue of, 
the provisions of the aforesaid Chapter 3 1 o of the Acts of the 
General Assembly of r 938. 
5. That as a means of financing the development of a 
low-rent housing project or projects, the defendant Authority 
approved, and authorized the execution of, a contract with the 
United States Housing Authority (hereinafter called the "US-
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HA"), dated June 13, 1939, whereby the said USHA agrees to 
purchase bonds of the said Authority in the sum of SIX HUN-
DRED FORTY FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($644,-
000.00), to bear interest at the rate of three and one-fourth per 
centum ( 3 Y4 % ) per annum, payable serially over a period of 
years beginning in 1955 and ending in I 999, all as more fully 
appears by reference to a copy of the loan contract hereto an-
nexed, made a part hereof, and marked "Exhibit Loan Con-
tract." 
6. That as a means of financing the operation and main-
tenance of said projects, so as to enable the said Authority to 
maintain the low-rate character of said projects, the defendant 
Authority has approved and authorized the execution of an an-
nual contributions contract with the USHA, dated June I 3, 
193 9, whereby the USHA agrees to contribute to said Author-
ity annually, over a period of sixty ( 60) years, a sum of money 
equal to three and three-fourths per centum (3 ~ %) 
page 5 ] of the actual development cost of the projects, as 
determined by the USHA, but in no event to exceed 
the amount of TWENTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUN-
DRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS ($29,550.00) annually, all 
more fully appearing by reference to a copy of said annual con-
tributions contract hereto annexed, made a part hereof, and 
marked "Exhibit Annual Contributions Contract." 
7. That the City and the Authority have entered into a 
cooperation agreement under date of March 27, I 939, where-
by the City agrees that, during the period commencing with the 
date of the acquisition of any part of the site or sites for each 
project, and continuing throughout the useful life of such pro-
ject, it will not levy any taxes against. the project and it will 
furnish, without cost or charge to the Authority or the tenants 
thereof, municipal services and facilities for such project and 
the tenants thereof, of the same character as those furnished 
without cost or charge for other dwellings and inhabitants in 
the City. A copy of said agreement is hereby annexed, made a 
part hereof and marked "Exhibit Cooperation Agreement." 
8. That pursuant to said contracts, the Authority has 
acquired by purchase and condemnation proceedings all of the 
real estate determined upon by it as needed for its purposes, 
covering and including both its white and colored projects (ex-
cept that one condemnation proceeding is yet pending involving 
Mumpower vs. Housing Authority of Bristol 2 I 
only one lot) : has issued its advance loan notes to the USHA 
in the sum of $ ........ for the purposes of paying therefor; 
has received the funds on said notes and has paid for and ac-
quired title to all of said property except the one lot now in-
volved in said condemnation proceeding. 
page 6 ] 9. That defendant Authority, on the 23rd day of 
February, 1 940, entered into a contract with V. L. 
Nicholson Company, Incorporated, for the demolishing of all 
buildings on the sites so acquired for both the white and colored 
projects, for doing the necessary grading and for the construc-
tion of 145 units on the projects to be occupied by white ten-
ants, and 7 4 units to be occupied by colored tenants. The 
total contract price for such demolishing, grading and construc-
tion of units is $586,000.00: work has commenced thereunder; 
practically all existing buildings have been demolished; the 
greater part of grading has been done and construction work be-
gun. 
1 o. That pursuant to the loan contract referred to here-
in, the defendant Authority proposes to issue bonds in the total 
authorized amount of $788,000.00, and unless restrained by 
this court, will issue, sell and deliver such bonds; that the de-
fendant Authority proposes to issue such bonds without sub-
mitting them for approval to the qualified voters of the City of 
Bristol, and complainant is advised that said bonds will con-
stitute a bonded indebtedness of said City, in violation of Sec-
tion 127, paragraph (b), of the Constitution of the State of 
Virginia. 
Complainant is advised that the said bonds which the de-
fendant Authority proposes to issue, and referred to in the pre-
ced_ing paragraph, are purported to be issued under Section I 4 
of Chapter 3 1 o of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1938, 
and that it proposes to issue said bonds as being obligations of 
the Housing Authority of the City of Bristol; that said bonds 
will in fact constitute obligations of the City of Bris-
page 7 ] tol, all in violation of Section 127, paragraph (b), 
of the Constitution of the State of Virginia; that 
the said Housing Autpority of the City of Bristol is in fact an 
agency of the City of Bristol, is not a separate legal entity, and 
that the bonds of srlid Authority will constitute an indebtedness 
of said City. 
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1 1. Complainant is further advised and alleges that the 
above-mentioned proceedings and action of the City Council in 
authorizing the Mayor to appoint members of the Authority; 
the action of the Mayor in making such appointments; the 
organization of the Authority: the cooperation agreement be-
tween the Authority and the City; the contracts between USHA 
and the Authority: the contract between the Authority and V. 
L. N. Co., are all illegal and invalid for the following reasons: 
(a) The General Assembly was without power to create 
in each city and county (political sub-divisions of the State) 
other political sub-divisions to be known as housing authorities, 
and any proceedings taken or act done, under the provisions of 
Chapter 3 1 o of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1938, are 
void and of no effect. 
(b) Property owned by housing authorities, created by 
Section 4, Chapter 3 1 o, Acts of the General Assembly of 193 8, 
is not exempt from taxation under the provisions of Section 
r 83. Article 1 3, of the Constitution. 
(c) Slum clearance and low-rent housing for persons 
of low income are not public purposes, and the exercise by the 
Authority of the power of eminent domain will constitute a 
taking of private property for a private use and for private pur-
poses, in violation of the fundamental principles of a republi-
can form of government. 
page 8 ] (d) The bonds proposed to be issued by the Au-
thority will constitute an increase in the bonded in-
debtedness of the City, in violation of Section 127 of Article 
VIII of the Constitution. 
( e) The cooperation agreement between the City· and 
the Authority is an attempt on the part of the present City 
Council to bind its successors in office in the exercise of gov-
ernmental functions, in violation of Section 185 of Article XIII 
of the Constitution. 
12. That unless permanently enjoined by the court the 
defendants will, in furtherance of the said housing program, 
cause great and irreparable damage to the plaintiff and to all 
other property owners and taxpayers similarly situated, by en-
gaging in an illegal enterprise tending to destroy the rental 
value of their property and greatly increase their tax burden. 
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13. In addition, complainant alleges that there exists an 
actual controversy between him and others similarly situated 
and the defendants; that the validity and interpretation of the 
Act, ordinance and contracts in question, as well as the rights 
of plaintiff, are involved and should be determined by this 
court, and a declaratory decree or judgment entered thereon and 
concerning the same. 
14. Complainant therefore prays: 
(a) That Housing Authority of the City of Bristol and 
City of Bristol be made parties defendant hereto and required 
to answer this bill, but their answers under oath are waived. 
(b) That the action of the City Council in authorizing 
the Mayor to appoint the members of said Authority, 
page 9 ] and all the acts of said Authority to be declared null 
and void; that the defendants, and each of them, be 
enjoined from carrying out the contracts described herein and 
from the issuance of any bonds for the purpose of carrying out 
the proposed project or projects; from further acquiring title to 
any land either by gift, demise, purchase or condemnation for 
such purpose or projects; from taking any further steps in fur-
therance of such projects, and that Chapter 3 1 o of the Acts of 
the General Assembly of I 938 be declared invalid and uncon-
stitutional. 
(c) That a declaratory decree or judgment be entered as 
hereinbefore prayed for. 
(d) That such other, further and general relief may 
be granted as the nature of the case may require or to a court 
of equity may seem proper. 
W. R. MUMPOWER, 
JONES & WOODWARD, 
p. q. 
page 10 ] DEMURRER OF HOUSING AU-
THORITY, Filed May 13. I 940 
By Counsel. 
Defendant Housing Authority says complainant's bill and 
each part thereof is not sufficient in law and assigns the fol-
lowing: 
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GROUNDS OF DEMURRER 
1. The Virginia housing authorities law, and every part 
thereof, is a vaild exercise of authority by the General Assembly 
of the State and is constitutional, and all acts done and con-
tracts executed thereunder, as a result thereof, by defendant 
Housing Authority are valid and binding. 
2. The housing authority law, the things alleged as be-
ing done and contemplated thereunder, the resolution adopted 
by defendant City and quoted in the bill, and all other things 
alleged to have been done by defendant City are valid under the 
police power reserved in the constitution. 
3. Bonds of defendant Housing Authority are not obli-
gations of defendant City, either under the laws of the State of 
Virginia or under any agreements between the City and the 
Authority. 
4. The bill alleges no legislative act, resolution, contract, 
action or contemplated action, which is invalid. 
DONALD T. ST ANT. 
BRADLEY ROBERTS, 
Attorneys for Housing Authority. 
page 1 1 ] DEMURRER OF CITY OF BRIS-
TOL, Filed May 13, 1940 
The City of Bristol comes and says that the said bill of 
complaint and each part thereof is not sufficient in law, and 
for grounds of demurrer states the following: 
1. It appears from the allegations of the bill that the 
defendant Housing Authority has been duly created and estab-
lished pursuant to Housing Authorities Law as a separate and 
distinct corporate entity and as a political sub-division of the 
State with enumerated and specified powers. (Acts of As-
sembly 1938, page 447, Va. Code, Supp. Sec. 3145 (1) to 
( 24). See Va. Const. Sections 65, 14 7 and I 83 (a). 
2. Section 14 of the said law expressly provides that the 
bonds and obligations of the Authority shall not be debts of the 
City a11d that such bonds and obligations shall be payable only 
out of funds and properties of the Authority. 
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3. Said Housing Authorities Law is constitutional. (See 
references a~ove and New York City Housing Authority vs. 
Muller, (NY) 1 N E 2d r 53, 105 ALR 905; Chapman vs. 
Huntington Housing Authority (W. Va.) 3 S E 2d 502, 507 
and cases there cited. 
4. There is no equity in the Bill.' 
FLOYD H. ROBER TS, 
City Attorney. 
page r 2 ] FINAL DECREE, July I 9, 1 940 
This cause heretofore came on to be heard upon the bill of 
complaint and the separate demurrers of the defendants to the 
bill and each part thereof, and was argued by counsel; where-
upon, the court took time to consider. 
And now, having maturely considered the same, the court 
is of opinion, for reasons stated in writing, and filed as a part 
of the record, that the demurrers of both defendants should be 
sustained as to all portions of the relief prayed, except that 
portion praying a declaratory judgment as to the validity and 
interpretations of the contracts herein. Accordingly, it is de-
creed that the demurrers be sustained to the extent stated, and 
the bill dismissed to the extent that it asks relief contrary to the 
action of the court upon the demurrers. 
To the action of the court in sustaining the demurrers as 
to any portion of the bill, complainant by counsel excepted; 
and to the action of the court in failing to sustain the demur-
rers as to the whole bill, the defendants, each by counsel ex-
cepted. 
Thereupon, complaint not desiring to amend his bill, and 
the defendants not desiring to plead further at this time, but 
relied upon their demurrers to the whole bill, the court doth 
proceed to adjudge and decree as follows: 
That the following provisions of the Corporation Agree-
ment between the City of Bristol and Bristol Housing Author-
ity of Bristol, Virginia, to the extent that they undertake to 
bind the present or any future council in the exercise of their 
future legislative discretion, are invalid and void for reasons 
stated in the opinion upon the demurrers, said portions being 
in the following language: 
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( 1) That portion of Paragraph 1 I reading: "It fur-
ther agrees that without charge to the Authority, it will vacate 
and close any streets, roads, roadways, alleys, sidewalks or 
other plates ( which the Authority finds are reason-
page 1 3 ] ably necessary in the development of the Project), 
located in _the area of such Project or adjacent there-
to." 
( 2) That portion of the first sentence of Paragraph 12 
reading: -And the city agrees to accept for municipal pur-
poses-". 
In all other respects the terms of this and the other con-
tracts exhibited with the bill ("The Loan Ctract" and "An-
nual Contribution Contract") are declared valid. 
The Court doth further deny the prayer for an injunction 
herein. 
Nothing further remaining to be done in this cause, the 
same is stricken from the docket. 
page 14 ] MOTION, Filed July 26, 1940. 
Defendant Housing Authority moves the court to amend 
final decree entered at the present term, so as to strike therefrom 
the holding that a portion of paragraph 1 1 and a portion of 
paragraph 1 2 of the cooperation agreement is invalid, for rea-
sons stated in stipulation of the parties this day filed as a part 
of the record. 
page 1 5 ] STIPULATION. Filed July 26, 1940 
For the purposes of motion made by Housing Authority 
on this date, it is agreed that the following are facts, and may 
be considered as such on said motion: 
1. By an ordinance adopted by the Council of the City 
of Bristol on April 10, 1939, a ten foot alley running all the 
way through the block in which the colored housing project 
is located and now under construction, was closed, the ordinance 
reciting that all the property in said block on both sides of 
said alley was then owned by the Housing Authority; that it 
was in the interest of the public that said alley be closed, and 
that under the terms of the cooperation agreement exhibited in 
this proceeding, it was likewise proper that said alley be closed. 
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2. By an ordinance adopted April 1 9, 1940, all the 
streets and alleys located within the Housing Authority's white 
project were closed, the ordinance reciting that said Authority 
had acquired for its low rent housing and slum clearance pro-
jects all the property within the limits of which said streets and 
alleys were located, and that it was deemed in the interest of 
the public to close the same, and also in accordance with said 
cooperation agreement. 
3. On November 16, 1939, Minute Book I 3, page 88, 
the Housing Authority proposed to widen Oakview Street ten 
feet on its eastern side between Quarry and Mary Streets, and 
offered to give the necessary land for that purpose, provided 
the City would accept, grade and improve the same for street 
purposes, and the City Council, by resolution, unanimously ac-
cepted such offer. 
page 1 6 ] The building line on property adjoining the east 
side of Oakview A venue has been set back accord-
ingly. 
The bill is treated as amended in accordance with this 
stipulation, and the demurrers filed as applying to the bill as 
thus amended. 
JONES & WOODWARD, 
Attorney for Complainant. 
DONALD T. STANT, 
Attorney for Housing Authority. 
FLOYD H. ROBER TS, 
Attorney for City of Bristol. 
page 17 ] DECREE ON MOTION. July 26, 1940 
This cause came on again this day to be heard upon the 
written motion of defendctnt Housing Authority to amend 
final decree in the respects shown in said motion, supported by 
stipulation in writing signed by counsel for all parties to this 
suit. 
Upon consideration whereof, the court being of opinion 
that its construction of the portion of paragraph r I and 12 of 
cooperation agreement is correct, and that said portions of con-
tract should be construed under the prayer of complainant's 
bill, notwithstanding the facts set out in the stipulation afore-
said ( which by agreement it treated as an amendment to the 
bill) doth deny said motion and each of the defendants excepts. 
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Nothing further remaining to be done herein, this cause is 
stricken from the docket. 
page 18 ] ~ECREE, July 3 1, 1 940 
By agreement of the parties hereto by their attorneys, it is 
ordered that in making transcript of record for the purpose of 
applying for an appeal, instead of copying exhibits as a part 
thereof, the following shall be certified by the Clerk of this 
court and sent up along with the transcript as original ex-
hibits: 
1. Cooperation agreement between City of Bristol and 
Housing Authority, dated March 27, 1939. 
2. Loan contract between Housing Authority and United 
States Housing Authority, dated June I 3, 193 9. 
3. Annual contributions contract between Housing Au-
thority and United States Housing Authority, dated June 13, 
1939. 
Agreed to: 
JONES & WOODWARD, 
Attorney for Complainant. 
DONALD T. STANT, 
Attorney for Housing Authority. 
FLOYD H. ROBER TS, 
Attorney for City of Bristol. 
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vs. OPINION 
Housing Authority of the City of Bristol and City 
of Bristol. 
Complainant, who alleges that he is a citizen, resident, tax-
payer and property owner of the City of Bristol, Va., files his 
bill herein, assailing the organization of the Housing Authority 
of the City of Bristol, and questioning its right to carry out its 
functions in general. Specifically, the bill challenges the right 
of said Authority to issue bonds, the right of the City Council, 
by its resolution or ordinance, to authorize the Mayor to ap-
point members of the Authority, the action of the Mayor in 
makiP.g such appointments, the organization of the Authority, 
the authority to enter into and the validity of the cooperation 
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agreement between the Authority and the City, the legality and 
validity of the two contracts between the Bristol Authority and 
the U. S. H. A. and the legality and validity of the contract 
between the Bristol Authority and V. L. Nicholson Co., copies 
of all of the contracts except the last being exhibited with the 
bill, and asks a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the 
entire "Housing Authorities Law" (Charter 3 1 o, Acts of As-
sembly 1938, Code Supp. Sec. 3145 (1)-(24) inc.) here-
inafter referred to as the "act". 
The Grounds of Attack are Briefly: 
1. The general assembly is without power to create such 
Authority. 
2. The property of such Authority is not exempt from 
taxation under Virginia Constitution Sec. 183. 
3. The purpose of the Authority is not a public pur-
po:;e, and the taking of property by it is for a private use. 
4. Its bonds are bonds of the City and are illegal as in 
violation of Virginia Constitution Sec. 127. 
5. The contract of the city with the Authority is illegal 
in that it undertakes to bind future mem hers of the City Coun-
cil in the exercise of their legislative functions contrary to Vir-
ginia Constitution Sec. 185. 
6. The general question as to the validity of the entire 
"Act". 
page 20 ] The defendants file separate demurrers to the bill 
upon the ground that the "Act" is constitutional, 
and that the acts and contracts complained of are pursuant there-
to and in compliance therewith. 
The contentions will be disposed of in the order herein-
after designated. 
The court is greatly assisted by the able briefs filed by 
counsel which demonstrate careful consideration and investi-
gation of the questions involved. 
Logical sequence calls for consideration, first, of two basic 
questions, which are covered by contentions" 1" and "3" above. 
They are, first, the power of the Legislature to create the Hous-
ing Authority, and second, whether the property of the Au-
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thority is devoted to a public use. Naturally, if the Authority 
cannot lawfully be created, then that is decisive of the case. 
Likewise if it may be lawfully created, but may not condemn 
property for the reason that the property would be devoted to a 
private use, such Authority would be so hampered in its func-
tions as to practically defeat its purpose. 
The handling of these two questions involves considera-
tion of the foundations of the police power and the power of 
eminent domain. 
It has been said, West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, I 69 
Va. 271, quoting from Town of Winsdor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 
357, 111 A 354, 356, I2 A. L. R. 669: 
''The line between eminent domain and the police power 
is a hard one to hold with constancy and consistency, and it is 
not surprising that now and again these two great powers of 
government have been confused." 
Such confusion is probably due almost entirely to the fact 
that the object to be attained by the exercise of each fundamental 
power is the same, and the reason for the exercise of the power 
the same, that is, the public benefit. Such con-
page 21 ] fusion will be avoided in this discussion by handling 
each separately; however, the similarity of reason 
and purpose will be apparent. 
It is contended that the power of the Legislature to create 
the Housing Authority may be sustained by several reasons: 
First, because it is a valid exercise of the police. power; second. 
because embraced in the general legislative power without pro-
hibition or restraint: and, third, because specifically authorized 
by Virginia· Constitution, Section 147. 
Let us consider these contentions in the above order, first 
as to the police power. 
The declared purpose of the Act is as follows, Code Sec. 
3145 (2): 
"It is hereby declared: (A) that the clearance, replanning 
and reconstruction of the areas in which insanity or unsafe 
housing conditions exist and the providing of safe and sanitary 
dweliing accommodations for persons of low income are public 
uses and purposes for which public money may be spent and 
private property acquired and are governmental functions of 
grave concern to the Commonwealth;-" 
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The Act then proceeds in paragraph ( 3) to define a 
"slum" and to define a "housing project", among other provis-
ions, as in undertaking to clear slum areas and provide de-
cent, safe and sanitary living accommodations for persons of 
low income. 
It is, therefore, to be seen that the Act has as its primary 
and avowed purpose the eradication of slums, and, in order to 
accomplish this, it attacks the situation from two angles: onet 
the elimination of existing slums, and two, the establishment 
of modern standard living accommodations, an inseperable in-
cident to the accomplishment of the primary purpose. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that slum areas where 
many people gather under the lowest possible standards of liv-
ing, crowded together in dilapidated hovels which 
page 22 ] are unsafe, unsanitary and unhealthful, in a sordid 
atmosphere, are the places where is bred, nurtured, 
and brought to its destructive fruition the greater percentage of 
crime and moral degeneracy; likewise that such are the breed-
ing places from which disease is spread; and, worst of all, such 
places are self-perpetuating in that offsprings born under such 
conditions are damned, from the day of their arrival in this 
world, to the life of their fathers. Such gathering places of 
filth, lust, crime, disease and degeneracy are a tragic detriment 
not only to their inhabitants, but are in every respect a social 
and economic, detriment to the people at large. Their eradi-
cation is a matter of vital concern to the public and to the State. 
That the existence of such situations is detrimental to the health, 
safety, morals, general welfare and general prosperity of the 
people is so clear as not to require any reasoning. That it is a 
subject for the exercise of the police power is equally clear. 
Thus, under well recognized principles, the Authority, 
to the extent that it is established for the purpose of eliminat-
ing slum areas, may be created under the police power of the 
State. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that this is true 
as to the functions of the Authority in regard to erecting and 
maintaining low-rent projects, which proposition will be next 
examined. 
This question is not free from difficulty. It is presented 
by complainant in his brief in the form of the assertion "-
That government interference or operation could be extended 
to almost every conceivable private enterprise if the only neces-
sary reason for so doing were that (the) desired result, public 
health. could be more cheaply obtained for low income classest 
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by use of government funds and tax exemption x x 
page 23 ] until we should have a completely socialized or 
communised state." 
If the court thought that the effect of a decision favorable 
to the Authority in this case would have such a result, it would 
unhesitatingly decree against it. 
It is true that this contention finds support in the opinion 
in Ohio v. Helvering, 78 L. Ed. 1307 where it is said: 
"Nevertheless, the police power is and remains a govern-
mental power, and applied to business activities is the power to 
regulate those activities, not to engage in carrying them on. Rippe 
v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 111, 112, 57 N. W. 33 I, 22 L. R. A. 
85 7. If a state chooses to go into the business of buying and 
selling commodities, its right to do so may be conceded so far 
as the federal Constitution is concerned, but the exercise of the 
right is not the performance of a governmental function, and 
must find its support in some authority apart from the police 
power." 
However, the statement must be considered in connection 
with the issue involved in that case. There, the state of Ohio 
sought to enjoin the collectors of internal revenue for the Unit-
ed States from collecting federal liquor dealer's license taxes on 
state owned liquor dispensaries. It was contended that the 
State, in operating the dispensaries, was engaging in a govern-
mental function under its police power, and was not subject to 
federal taxation in regard to its governmetal functions. The 
Court held that the state was engaging in a proprietary function 
and as such was taxable. 
In considering the effect of this holding, it must be re-
membered that the liquor traffic has long occupied a peculiar 
field, when compared to traffic in other commodities, and that 
the power not only to regulate but to entirely prohibit the traf-
fic has been generally accorded. See State ex rel George v. Aik-
en (S. C.) 20 S. E. 2 2 1, 26 L. R. A. 345, and cases cited, in-
cluding quotation at p.- 3 5 2, (L R. A. report) fromCrow/ey v. 
Christensen, 13 7 U. S. 90 34 L. Ed. 623. The opinion in 
State ex rel v. Aiken is in conflict with Ohio v. H elvering, the 
former sustaining the constitutionality of a state dis-
page 24 ] pensary law by holding that the operation of dis-
pensaries is incident to the regulation of the liquor 
traffic under the police power. In doing so it distinguishes the 
case of Rippe v. Becher, ( cited as authority in Oh!'o v. H elver-
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ing) declaring void an "act to provide for the purchase of a 
site and for the erection of a state elevator at Duluth for pub-
lic storage of grain" upon the difference that such statute was 
not aimed at a "business dangerous to the health, morals and 
safety of the people." 
Although state operation of a liquor dispensary may not 
be, for federal tax purposes, an exercise of the police power, 
the reasoning of Ohio v. Helvering does not prevent State (or 
delegated) operation of low cost housing projects in further-
ance of the elimination of slums. The supplying by the State 
of liquor, which might otherwise, with full authority, be de-
clared entirely contraband, is entirely different from supplying 
wholesome living quarters in an effort to get rid of slum con-
ditions, which cannot be prohibited or legislated out of exist-
ence. There is a more direct connection between the primary 
purpose to be accomplished and the means employed to attain 
it in the latter instance than in the former. In the former it is 
a matter of enforcement expediency; in the latter it is a matter 
of prime necessity to the accomplishment of the fundamental 
purpose. 
There is nothing in the nature of the police power which 
precludes the idea that a state or a political sub-division thereof 
under authority from the State may, if necessary, enter into a 
business in order to effectuate a result properly coming within 
the scope of such soverign power. The various holdings of 
the courts and statements of text writers amply justify this 
statement. Some of those statements in regard to 
page 25 ] the police power follows: 
A quotation from Black on Intoxicating Liquors 
in State ex rel George v. Aiken ( supra) p. 3 5 2 thus states the 
powers: 
"It cannot be doubted, however, that the origin of this 
power must be sought in the very purpose and framework of 
organized society. It is fundamental and essential to govern-
ment. It is a necessary and inherent attribute of soverignty. 
It antedates all laws, and may be described as the assumption on 
which constitutions rest: for the state x x must have the power 
to preserve its own existence in safety and prosperity, else it 
could neither fulfil the law of its being, nor discharge its duties 
to the individual. And to this end it is necessarily invested with 
power to enact such measures as are adopted to secure its own au-
thority and peace, and preserve its constituent members in safe-
ty, health and morality. Theories of the state, according as 
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· they tend to enlarge or restrict the legitimate sphere of its func-
tions and activities, will create theories as to the proper limi-
tation of the police power." 
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 28 L. Ed. 923, 924, 
quoted in the same case states thus: 
"But neither the amendment (fourteen) broad and com-
prehensive as it is,· nor any other amendment, was designed to 
interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its 'po-
lice power' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, 
morals, education and good order of the people, and to legis-
late so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its re-
sources, and add to its wealth and prosperity." Italics sup-
plied). 
In the "Slaughter House Cases" Butchers' etc, vs. Crescent 
City, etc., 21 L. Ed. 395, I 6 Wall. 36 is said: 
"This is called the police power; and it is declared by 
Chief Justice Shaw that it is much easier to perceive and realize 
the existence and sources of it than to mark its boundaries or 
prescribe limits to its exercise. Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84." 
"This power is, and must be from its very nature, in-
capable of any very exact definition or limitation. Upon it de-
pends the security of social order, the life and health of the 
citizens, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated com-
munity, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the bene-
ficial use of property. (Italics supplied) . " 
" 'It extends', says another eminent judge 'to the 
page 26 ] protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and 
quiet of all persons, and the protection of all prop-
erty within the state; x x and persons and property are sub-
jected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure 
the general comfort, health and prosperity of the State-.' '' 
"In Gibbens v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203, Chief Justice Mar-
shall x x says: 'They form a portion of that immense mass of 
legislation which controls everything within the territory of 
a state not surrendered to the general government x x ' " 
Most timely observations have been made by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia concerning the police power. In 
Bowman v. State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351,361, sustaining 
the "Cedar Rust Law", is the following: 
"As said concerning the 'police power' in Lawton v. Steele, 
162 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 3 8 L. Ed. 3 85; 'It is universal-
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ly conceded to include everything essential to the public safety, 
health and morals and to justify the destruction and abatement 
x x of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance x x. Be-
yond this, however, the State may interfere whenever the public 
interests demands xx'. " (Italics supplied). 
Again, in West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, I 69 Va. 
2 71, 28 2, we find the following: 
"In Gorieb v. Fox, supra" ( 145 Va. 554) "This court 
said: 
'The Legislature may, in the exercise of the police power, 
restrict personal and property rights in the interest of public 
health, public safety and for the promotion of the general wel-
fare.' '' · 
"This power 'embraces regulations designed to promote 
the public convenience or the general prosperity, as 
page 27 ] well as regulations designed to promote the public 
health, the public morals or the public safety.' Ba-
con v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 27 S. Ct. 289, 291, 51 L. Ed. 
499." 
"The pou:er is not limited to regulations designed to pro-
mote public health, public morals, or public safety, or to the 
suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary, but 
extends to so dealing with conditions which exist as to bring out 
of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public 
convenience or general prosperity' W ulfsonn v. Burden ( I 9 2 5) 
24 I, N. Y. 288, I 50 N. E. 120, 122, 43 A. L. R. 65 1." 
In the same opinion, quoting further from Gorieb v. Fox, 
it is said, p. 285: 
"The extent of this power is difficult to define, but it is 
elastic and expands automatically to protect the public against 
the improper use of private property to the injury of the public 
interest." (Italics supplied) 
The same thought is thus expressed in Mill er v. Board of 
Public Works (Cal) 234 P. 381, 38 A. L. R. 1479, writ of er-
ror dismissed 71 L. Ed. 889: 
"It is a apparent that the police power is not a circum-
scribed prerogative, but is elastic and, in keeping with the growth 
of knowledge and the belief in the popular mind of the need for 
its application, capable of expanding to meet existing conditions 
of modern life. and thereby keep pace with the social economic, 
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moral and intellectual evolution of the human race. x x There 
is nothing known to the law that keeps more in step with hu-
man progress than does the exercise of this power." 
This quotation is taken from the note to 1 1 Am. Jur. 980, 
Const. L. Sec. 25 3, which also cites Bowman v. State Entom-
ologist, (supra). 
In a wide review, including the above authorities, the court 
has found no other statement concerning the scope of the 'po-
lice power' which would prevent the State or its political sub-
division from entering into an enterprise, provided the other 
requisites for the exercise of the police power exist. 
page 28 ] On the contrary.in Strawberry, etc. v. Starbuck, 
1 24 Va. 71 upholding a statute ~uthorizing the 
creation of drainage districts, the right to establish such districts 
was sustained under the police power, the court stating p. 78: 
"It is a governmental agency, an unincorporated com-
munity, organized for a specific and limited purpose under the 
police power of. the state." (Italics supplied). 
More will be said of this case later. In passing, reference 
might also be made to establishment of public irrigation pro-
jects in the western states under the police power, the establish-
ment of national banks by Congress under the power incident to 
its granted powers (McCullouch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 3 16. 
4 L. Ed. 5 79) and other instances. 
So the question resolves itself down to whether low cost 
housing projects come within these principles of the police pow-
er. 
The Legislature, by its enactment, has found in the af-
firmative. 
It is true that the Legislature may not act arbitrarily, and 
that its determination is not final, but subject to supervision 
by the courts, Bowman v. State Entomologist. (supra) at p. 
368-369, and cases cited. But, as said in that case: 
"However, as appears from the authorities just cited a 
large discretion is vested in the legislature to determine what 
the interests of the public require, and also as to what is neces.:. 
sary for the protection of such interests and every possible pre-
sumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute." 
See also State ex rel v. Aiken (supra) ; Allydon Realty 
Corp v. Holyoke Housing Authority, (Mass) 23 N. E. (2d) 
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665; Chapman v. Huntington Housing Authority (W. Va.) 3 
S. E. (2d) 502, 509 and cases cited; Danville v. Hatcher, 101 
Va. 523, 529. 
There is nothing in the pleadings to suggest that the Leg-
islature has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Its enactment 
must be sustained unless-"It is clearly arbitrary and 
page 29 ] unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals or general welfare", 
West Bros. v. Alexandria (supra), Euclid v. Ambler, 71 L. Ed. 
303,Gorieb v. Fox, 71 L. Ed. 1228. The evil sought to be rem-
edied is a well known and recognized one, and, al though the 
present method of attack may be novel, it is justified under es-
tablished principles. These principles were designed to fit just 
such situations. As said in Bowman v. State Entomologist (su-
pra). "General welfare can no more be defined than can police 
power. These are terms which take on new definitions when 
we come to face new conditions.'' Since the Leislature finding 
is not arbitrary or unreasonable, but has a substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, it must be 
sustained. West Bros. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 288, quot-
ing Martin v. Danville, 148 Va. 247, to the following effect: 
"It is a settled rule of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, if the question of reasonableness is fairly debatable, to 
hold that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the legis-
lative body charged with the primary duty and responsibility 
of deciding the question". 
Neither is the wisdom of the enactment a matter for the 
court, Danville v. Hate her, 1 o I Va. 5 2 3. 'Courts cannot run a 
race of opinions upon points of right, reason and expediency 
with the law-making powers, Id. p. 5 34. 
"The best indications of public policy are to be found in 
the enactments of the Legislature," Danville v. Hatcher, (supra) 
p. 5 3 2, and "Courts take cognizance of public and social deve-
lopments and balance them as best they can against private 
rights." West Bros. v. Alexandria, (supra) p. 281. 
So the Legislature may, under the police power (which 
"shall never be abridged," Va. Const. Sec. 15 9 es-
page 30 ] tablish housing authorities unless otherwise inhabit-
ed by the fundamental law. 
Next, the Legislature is not prevented from establishing 
such authorities by the Constitution of Virginia. This Con-
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stitution is a limitation and restriction of powers rather than a 
grant of powers, Rc'chmond v. Va. Ry., 141 Va. 69, 91, Straw-
berry etc. v. Starbuck, I 24 Va. 71, 77 and cases cited. Full 
search reveals that there is nothing therein contained which lim-
its or restricts the power to create such a state agency and des-
ignate it as a political sub-division of the Commonwealth. To 
like effect was the holding in Strawberry etc. v. Starbuck, (su-
pra) where it is said, p. 76: 
''It has been said that the exact status of such districts is an 
academic question: Certainly it is not necessary to define it with 
prec1s1on. Such districts have been denominated public; or 
quasi public corporations, quasi municipal corporations; and it 
is also said that they are not corporations at all, but merely 
governmental agencies for the administration of a legislative 
power. It has been held that a constitutional power express-
ly granted to the legislature to organize various specified munici-
pal and quasi municipal corporations not including drainage 
districts, does not preclude the organization of such districts; 
and that town officers performing duties imposed upon them 
in connection with the administration of a drainage district, act 
as representatives of the state and not of the town." 
Not only is all specific restriction absent. but on the con-
trary there is a general grant by Section 63, providing that "the 
authority of the general assembly shall extend to all subjects of 
legislation not herein forbidden or restricted." 
page 3 1 ] "It would seem further that the power is specifical-
ly granted by Section 14 7 providing: "Such public 
welfare, charitable, sanitary, benevolent, reformatory or penal 
institutions as the claims of humanity and the public good may 
require shall be established and operated by the Commonwealth 
under such organization and in such manner as the general as-
sembly may prescribe." 
The purposes of a housing authority under the act appear 
to meet fully the classification of "charitable, sanitary and 
benevolent" institutions established for the "public welfare." 
Therefore the contention of defendants is sustained as to 
all three bases of the Legislative power to establish housing au-
thorities. 
As an incident to this question, there is drawn in issue the 
right to delegate to the City the authority to determine when 
the Housing Authority created for that locally shall become op-
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erative, the authority of the mayor to appoint its commission-
ers and the legality of the organization of the Bristol Authority. 
As will be seen from the act, Section 4, the General As-
sembly has, itself, created a housing authority for each city and 
county. It remains in a dormant state until brought into ac-
tion by the local governing body. Therefore, the Authority is 
already in existence in each locality, wtfh the option in the local 
governing body to start it functioning or not. Since the Legis-
lature has the authority to create it, it has the authority to de-
termine when it shall act. It has, by the act, delegated this au-
thority to the local governing body. The authorities are over-
whelming that this is a valid delegation of legislative authority, 
Bowman v. State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 375-379, where 
the following appears at page 3 75: 
page 3 2 ] ''This position x x loses sight of the consideration 
that such clause ('equal protection') permits of a 
wide scope of discretion on the part of the legislature in classi-
fication in the adoption of police laws, and also leaves out of 
consideration the well understood legislative local option pow-
er, so to speak, of permitting localities which may be affected 
by a police regulation to accept or reject it by vote of the peo-
ple, or by action of officials of the locality, where a statute is by 
its terms thus conditioned in its application." (Italicts sup-
plied). 
In the Bowman Case the "cedar rust" law, which was up-
held, was left, for its application, to the will of the board of su-
pervisors, or of the qualified voters under the terms set forth 
in the statute. 
See alsoDanville v. Hatcher, 1 o I Va. 5 2 3, 5 3 o where it is 
said: 
"In the absence of constitutional restrictions, it is com-
petent for the Legislature to confer its police power upon munici-
pal corporations in such measure as it deems expedient. It can-
not of course, bestow greater power than the state itself pos-
sesses, and it must keep within the organic law. Subject to 
these restraints, it is within the province of the Legislature to in-
vest such corporations with the police power of the state in 
whole or in part." 
Upon the same subject see also Ex Parte Bassitt, 90 Va. 
679, 682: Ould v. Richmond. 23 Gratt. 464, 467; Strawberry 
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ect. v. Starbuck. 1 24 Va. 71, 76; Kirkpatrick v. Board of Su-
pervisors. 146Va.113, 126-127 and cases there cited. 
Having the power, therefore, to delegate this legislative au-
thority to the locality, then the action of the local body is gov-
erned by· the same principles as have been referred to in sus 
taining the legislative finding. 
Again, there is no issue of fact raised by the pleadings in 
this case as to the correctness of the finding of the Council of 
Bristol, Va., but only an issue of law as to its au-
page 3 3 ] thority to act. As shown, the Legislature does 
have the power to authorize it, and the act in spe-
cific terms does authorize it. Consequently, the action of the 
council in passing the resolution, the action of the Mayor in ap-
pointing Commissioners and the legality of the organization of 
the Bristol Housing Authority must all be sustained. 
The next question is whether the property of the author-
ity is devoted to public use, so as to support the right of eminent 
domain. 
It is true that the "Act" declares that its purposes are "pub-
lic uses and purposes for which public money may be spent and 
private property acquired", Sec. 3 I 45 ( 2). It is also true that 
Virginia Constitution, Sec. 5 8 provides "the term 'public uses' 
to be defined by the general assembly. However the power 
to ·define is not the power to declare, and the declaration is not 
conclusive. The Lelislature has fulfilled its duty to define by 
the passage of Code Sec. 3030b. Consequently the question 
still remains a judicial one, as said in Light v Danville, 168 Va. 
18 I. 208, "This court has consistently held that whether a con-
demnation is for a public or a private use, it is a judicial ques-
tion and is subject to the review of the courts", Citing State 
Highway Com'r. v. Kreger, 128 Va. 203 and Nichols v. Central 
Va. Power Co., 143 Va. 405. So, it is incumbent upon the 
court to inquire into this question. 
The nature and purpose of a housing authority have al-
ready been discussed; it only remains to examine them in the 
light of established principles. 
The opinion in Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va. 18 r, 
dealing with what is a public use reads as follows: 
page 34 ] "Justice Campbell said in Nichols v. Central Vir-
ginia P. Co., 143 Va. 405, 130 S. E. 764, 44 A. L. 
R. 727, in approving the able and compresensive opinion of 
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Judge Cardwell in Fallsburg etc. Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va., 98 
43 S. E. 194, 61 L. R. A. 129, 99 Am. St. Rep. 855; 
" 'A use to be public must be fixed and definite. It must 
be one in which the public, as such, has an interest, and the terms 
and manner of its enjoyment must be within the control of the 
state, independent of the rights of the private owner of the prop-
erty appropriated to the use. The use of property cannot be 
said to be public if it can be gainsaid, denied or withdrawn by 
the owner. The public interest must dominate the private 
gain.''' 
"The Virginia cases have consistently adopted the above 
theory of construction, Miller v. Pulaski (two cases) 109 Va. 
137, 63 S. E. 880, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552, and 114 Va. 85, 
75, S. E. 767-" (and other cases there cited). 
The case again at p. 206, quotes Chief Justice Campbell in 
Nichols v. Central Va. P. Co. as follows: 
"It is difficult at times to observe the line of demarcation 
between private benefit and public use, when the two are thus 
so blended, the judicial practice in such cases is to approve the 
undertaking if it is capable of furthering the public use and dis-
regard the private benefit as a mere incident." 
InJeter v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co., 1 r 4 Va. 769 78 r, 
the court quotes the following: 
"The reason of the case and the settled practice of free 
government must be our guides in determining what is or what 
is not to be regarded as a public use; and that only can be con-
sidered such where the government is supplying its own needs, 
or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those matters 
of public necessity, convenience or welfare, which on account 
of their peculiar character and the difficulty, per-
page 3 5 ] haps impossibility, of making provision for them 
otherwise it is alike proper, useful and needful for 
the government to provide." 
In view of what has already been said concerning the pur-
pose of the housing authority with reference to eradicating slums, 
and as an indispensable incident, the providing of decent homes, 
the court considers that the use of the property in the instant 
case is a public one. 
The fact that the project may primarily benefit only a 
class does not take away the character of a public use. Bow-
man vs. State Entomoloyist, r 28 Va. 3 5 r, 3 72: Va. Devel. Co. 
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v. Crozier I. Co., 96 Va. I 26, 128-9 ;Barbier v. Connelly, 113 
U. S. 27, 28 L. Ed. 923, Strawberry v. Starbuck, supra. 
Complainant in paragraph r 2 of his bill complains of the 
com petition of the project with the property owned by him. 
This contention was disposed of in Williamson v. Housing Au-
thority of Augusta, (Ga) r 99 S. E. 43 in the following lang-
uage: 
"A like argument could be made by a property owner 
whenever the city takes over activities of the kind originally car-
ried on by private enterprise. The suggestion x x is complete-
ly answered by xx (Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 
58 S. Ct. 300, 304, 82 L. Ed. 374). 'The claim that petitioner 
will be injured, perhaps ruined, by the competition of municipal-
ities brought about by the use of the moneys, therefore, presents 
a clear case of damnum absque injuria. Stated in other words, 
these municipalities have the right under state law to engage in 
business in competition with petitioner, since it has been given 
no exclusive franchise. If its business be curtailed or destroyed 
by the operations of the municipalities, it will be by lawful 
competition from which no legal wrong results." 
page 3 6 ] Consequently, the taking of property is for a pub-
lic use, and that portion of the act bestowing the 
power of eminent domain is constitutional and does not violate 
Section 5 8 of the State Constitution. 
We come now to consideration of whether that portion of 
the "Act" exempting the property of an authority from taxation 
is constitutional. 
The Virginia Constitution, Sec. r 83, by paragraph (A) 
exempts from taxation "property owned directly or indirectly 
by the United States, the Commonwealth or any political sub-
division thereof-" The same section contains the further quali-
fying paragraph: 
"Whenever any building or land, or ,part thereof, men-
tioned in this section and not belonging to the state, shall be 
leased or shall otherwise be a source of revenue or profit, all 
such buildings and land shall be liable to taxation as other land 
and buildings in the same county, city or town." 
Under the Act, Sec. 3145 (3) a, (4) and (8), a housing 
authority is created as a "political sub-division" of the Com-
monwealth. Therefore its property is exempt from taxation 
under paragraph ( a) unless it should be leased or otherwise be 
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a source of revenue or profit. "Revenue" has been construed 
to mean "net revenue", Newport News v. Warwick County, 
159 Va. 571,594; and under the act Sec. 3145 (9) an Author-
ity is by law restrained from operating for profit or as a source 
of revenue. Thus the authority cannot bring itself within the 
constitutional exception subjecting its property to taxation, 
without violating the statute creating it. It is therefore con-
cluded that the property of the Authority is exempt from tax-
ation, and the portion of the contract between the City of Bris-
tol and the Authority, exempting the property of the latter 
from taxation is nothing more than a recognition of the con-
stitutional exemption. 
The next ground of attack to be considered is number 4 
under which it is contended that the bonds of the authority are 
bonds of the City and are illegal as in violation of 
page 3 7 ] Virginia Constitution Sec. 127. 
As ably reviewed by counsel for the Housing Au-
thority in its brief the way in which the city may issue bonds 
is specifically prescribed by law, and in that way, and that way 
only, can valid and binding obligations of the city be issued. 
Charter of Bristol Va. Sec. 42 (a), 42 (n), (k); Code of Va. 
Sec. 3079-90. Bonds issued under the "housing authorities 
law" would upon their face, have no semblance of purporting to 
be bonds of the City. In addition, the language of the Act on 
the question is unmistakably plain. Section 14 provides: 
"The bonds and other obligations of an authority (and 
such bonds and obligations shall so state on their face) shall 
not be a debt of the city, the county, tfie State or any political 
sub-division thereof (other than the authority) and neither 
the city or the county, nor the State or any political sub-divis-
ion thereof (other than the authority) shall be liable thereon, 
nor in any event shall such bonds or obligations be payable out 
of any funds or properties other than those of said authority. 
The bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness within the mean-
ing of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or re-
striction." 
As stated by counsel for the Authority in his brief (in re-
ferring to all of the statutory ·and charter provisions) "In no 
other manner may the city be bound by the issuance of bonds, 
and all who purchase are bound by these provisions and limi-
tations of authority and power." 
Consequently the conttntion of complainant in this res-
pect must fail. 
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Next it is contended that the contract of the City with the 
authority is invalid in that it undertakes to bind future mem-
bers of the City Council in the exercise of this legislative func-
tions. 
page 3 8 ] Specific attention is directed, in complainant's brief 
to Sections Io, 1 1, 1 2 and 1 3 of the Cooperation 
agreement. The objection urged is that these provisions con-
stitute an attempt "to barter away, surrender and abdicate, the 
powers granted to it by law." 
As previously noted, it is provided in the Constitution of 
Virginia, that the 'police power' shall never be abridged. 
Upon judicial determination, the principle is stated thus 
in Cooley's Constitutional Limitation ( 7th Ed.) p. 400 :-
"It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, 
and one based upon sound reason, that the state cannot barter 
away, or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those es-
sential powers which are inherent in all governments, and the 
exercise of which in full vigor is important to the well being of 
organized society, and that contracts to that end are void upon 
general principles, and cannot be saved from invalidity by the 
provision of the national Constitution now under considera-
tion" (against passing any law impairing the obligation of 
contracts) . 
For further statements of the principles, see Stone v. Mis-
sissippi. 25 L. Ed. ro79, New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drainage 
Comm. 49 L. Ed. 83 1, 1 I Am. Jur. 983, Sec. 254. 
"These principles apply to the police power delegated to 
municipal corporations. Thus, the general police power posses-
sed by a city is a continuing power, and is one of which a city 
cannot divest itself, by contract or otherwise." .r I Am. Jur. 
986, Sec. 254, note 5. 
Under these principles it must be determined what portions 
if any, of the paragraphs from the Cooperation Agreement deal 
with the police power or legislative power, and, if any be so 
found, whether they barter away or surrender that power. 
That portion of paragraph Io which deals with taxes and 
assessments has already been mentioned in another 
page 3 9 ] connection, and it is sufficient to say here that the 
terms of the contract are no more than an acknowl-
edgment of the legal right of the authority to such exemption. 
That portion which deals with furnishing municipal facilities 
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gives no greater right to the Authority than is enjoyed by citi-
zens in general. Maintaining the public facilities is a minister-
ial function, and therefore subject to contract. 
"The duty of a municipal corporation to see that its streets 
and sidewalks are in a safe condition; and that its sewers and 
drains are kept in good order, and that its other like municipal 
obligations are cared for, is a purely ministerial and absolute 
corporate duty." Terry v. Richmond, 94 Va. 537, 545-6. 
There is, in this paragraph, no surrender of the police pow-
er, or binding of future councils upon legislative matters. 
Paragraph 11 deals with zoning, which has been sustained 
because it is a valid exercise of the police power. West Bros. 
Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271. 
However, the terms of that paragraph applying to zoning 
are so drawn as not to hamper the discretion of future councils. 
It only agrees to zone or rezone to an appropriate site and neigh-
borhood classification. Such would be the duty of the Council 
under the law in any zoning ordinance adopted, Code Sec. 309 I 
(1)-(26). Sec. 3091 (3), in part, provides that the zoning 
plan shall be made "with a view to conserving the value of 
buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land." 
By order of Sept. 1 2, 1939. this court appointed a zoning com-
mission under Sec. 3091 ( 6) pursuant to resolution of the City 
Council. 
By the second sentence of paragraph r r the City "agrees 
that without charge to the Authority, it will vacate and close 
any streets, roads, roadways, alleys, sidewalks or other places 
( which the Authority finds are reasonably necessary in the de-
velopment of the Project) located in the area of 
page 40 ] said project or adjacent thereto." (Italics sup-
plied) . 
The court is unable to find any basis upon which the val-
idity of this sentence may be founded. It clearly, if sustained, 
places beyond the control of the local legislative representatives 
of the people, the determination of matters directly and vitally 
effecting the public safety. The location of public ways is pure-
ly a legislative function. 
"A corporation acts judicially in selecting and adopting a 
plan on which a public work shall be constructed; yet as soon as 
it begins to carry out that plan, it acts ministerially and is bound 
to see that it is done in a reasonably safe and skillful manner." 
Jones v. Richmond, 118 Va. 612, 619. 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
The same case at p. 6 r 9 quoting Judge Riley in Jones v. 
Williamsburg says: 
"The defendant was empowered by its charter to lay off 
streets and walks and improve the same, but it was wholly with-
in its discretion when and where it would do so. For the omis-
sion to exercise the power, it being legislative and discretion-
ary, it would not be liable." (Italics supplied). 
It has been said that the test of the validity of an act is not 
what has been done under it, but what may be done. In the in-
stant case, should the Authority see fit to close Myrtle Street, 
which borders the white project, and which is a part of the Lee 
Highway, or to close Mary Street, which passes through this 
project, and is a much traveled and convenient concrete street, 
the City would be required to do so. To thus illustrate the ex-
tent of the power given by the contract is to demonstrate its 
invalidity in this respect. · 
The remaining provisions of paragraph 1 1 are found un-
objectionable because they are thus conditioned: "So far as is 
possible to require removal thereof and without unusual ex-
pense or irn;onvenience." This provision safeguards the legis-
lative discretion. 
That portion of paragraph r 2 which binds the city 
page 4 r ] to accept such land as the Authority determines to be 
reasonably necessary for streets and alleys is in-
valid for the same reasons stated in dealing with the second sen-
tence of paragraph r r. The general power of cities over streets 
therein is conferred by Code Se.c. 3030. The Housing Author-
ity is created for a specific purpose, and there is not enumerated 
among its powers the right to determine the location of the 
city's streets. It therefore has no legislative powers in that res-
pect. It is simply inconsistent with the fundamental concepts 
of a city as a municipal corporation to say that another political 
sub-division located within its bounds may dictate as to when 
and where it shall open, close, pave and otherwise deal with pub-
fa ways within that city. The statute does not contemplate 
that such authority or the city shall so deal with the police power 
of the City. The remainder of paragraph r 2 is unobjectionable 
as it is, in substance, no more than an acknowledgment of the 
rights which any land-owner retains by law, upon the dedica-
tion of streets, Code Sec. 5 2 1 9. 
Again in regard to paragraph r 3, if it imposes an uncon-
ditional obligation upon the City, it would be invalid for rea-
sons already stated. However, that paragraph provides that 
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''such facilities shall be furnished and such work performed x x 
after arrangements have been made for financing x x in such 
manner as may be agreed upon by the City and the Authority." 
Thus it is seen that the obligation is conditioned upon the city 
agreeing upon the necessary financial arrangements, thereby 
preserving the legislative discretion of the Council. No other 
specific grounds of attack upon the agreement are set forth, and 
there is apparently no basis for further objections. 
The last ground of attack is that which attacks the valid-
ity of the Act in general, and asks a declaratory judgment as to 
the validity and interpretations of the act, ordinance 
page 4 2 ] and contracts in question. No specific questions, 
other than those already passed upon are raised; 
consequently the foregoing opinion disposes of the case; ex-
cept that there is one remaining question which is incident to 
the question of public use, and which it is necessary to discuss. 
The act, in paragraph 8 (d) confers upon the Authority the 
power "to sell x x transfer x x or dispose of any real x x prop-
erty or any interest therein." Again in paragraph 14 author~ 
izing the issuance of bonds and securing the payment of same, 
an authority may "mortgage x x any housing project, projects 
xx of the authority." Still further in paragraph 16 (b) is con-
ferred the power to "mortgage all or any part of its real x x 
property then owned or thereafter acquired.'' Then in para-
graph 1 o relating to rentals and tenant selection it is provided 
that "nothing in this or the preceding section " ( operating not 
for profit) "shall be construed as limiting the power of an au-
thority to vest in an obligee the right, in the event of default 
by the authority, to take possession of a housing project or cause 
the appointment of a receiver thereof, free from all the restric-
tions imposed by this or the preceding section." 
Are these provisions invalid as empowering the Authority 
to defeat the public use of its property? It is thought that they 
do not. We are dealing here with a political sub-division which 
has no power to tax, and whose only sources of credit are its 
property and contributions to it. It therefore becomes neces-
sary that it be empowered to mortgage its property in order to 
~ecure the funds with which to carry out its purposes. The 
nearest similar cases are those where municipal corporations, 
water commissioners, and other public agencies have been held 
to be authorized to mortgage public property to secure bonds. 
For a collection of th.ese cases see note in 3 9 A. L. R. beginning 
at page 216. 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
If these provisions of the act under consideration are in- . 
valid, the reason is not that the legislature does not possess the 
ultimate power to direct the disposition of public 
page 43 ] property, Cooley's Const. Lim. p. 342, but because 
even the legislature in dealing with property im-
pressed with a public trust must safeguard the rights of the ben-
ficiaries of that trust, which may be doubtful in the present in-
stance. 
A doubt, however, is insufficient, and all doubt must be 
solved in favor of the constitutionality of the enactment. 
Accordingly the demurrers to all portions of he bill which 
in any manner assail the validity of the Housing Authorities 
Law be sustained. 
The question of the constitutionality of state housing au-
thorities laws has been passed upon by a number of courts. 
Most of these cases are collected in a footnote by the court to 
Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, (Mass) 
23 N. E. (2d) 665, 669, and a more recent tabulation in Hum-
phery v. City of Phoenix, et al (Ariz.) decided May 6, 1 940. 
In all cases, so far as the court has been able to ascertain, such 
laws have been upheld. 
7/19/40 J. L. CANTWELL. JR., 
Judge. 
page 44 ] W. R. Mumpower 
vs. 
Housing Authority of the City of Bristol and City 
of Bristol 
It is agreed that the foregoing shall constitute the trans-
cript of record for the purpose of applying for an appeal, this 
the 30th day of July. 1940. 
JONES & WOODWARD, 
Attorneys for Complainant 
DONALD T. ST ANT, 
Attorney for Housing Authority 
FLOYD H. ROBER TS, 
Attorney for City of Bristol 
The foregoing is approved as the transcript of record for 
the purpose of applying for an appeal, this August, 1, 1940. 
JOS. L. CANTWELL, JR., 
Judge. 
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page 45 ] CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Dan Drinkard, Clerk of the Corporation Court of the 
City of Bristol, do certify that the foregoing is the transcript of 
record and agreement of parties for the purpose of applying for 
an appeal in the chancery cause of W.R. Mumpower vs. Hous-
ing Authority of City of Bristol and City of Bristol. 
This the 31st day of July, 1940. 
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